Japan by the Japanese/Chapter 2

‘The Restoration’ is that epoch-making event in the history of Japan that gave to her people the pre-eminent position in the Far East of being, as far as forms of government go, the professed and allied companion of the most powerful nations of the West. It meant also that the Emperor’s influence over Japan was brought back to the form and power that it held at the time of the first Emperor Jimmu, who reigned B.C. 660–584, and the Imperial Proclamation of the 14th of December, 1867 (3rd year of Kei-o), declares that its development is re-established upon the same basis as that laid 2,527 years ago.

The existence of the Shogunate since 1187 (2nd year of Bunji) under the Emperor’s authority gave a singular feature to the governmental system of Japan, and led to much misapprehension. That there reigned two Emperors contemporaneously over Japan, one ‘spiritual’ and the other ‘secular,’ was an idea which misled the outside world for centuries to an erroneous conception of Japan’s government. The real situation will be understood if it is remembered that the Shogun, the head of the Shogunate, was always appointed by the Emperor, and exercised in his name only the civil and military administration of the country, which were accredited to him as the hereditary right of his family. Thus, what are called the ‘rights of sovereignty’ have remained uninterruptedly in the person of the Emperor since the foundation of the Japanese Empire.

When the first Emperor Jimmu conquered the country and founded the empire, he, as head of the State, combined in himself the rights of sovereignty and supreme command of the army and navy, as the present Emperor does now according to the provisions of the Constitution. The Emperor Jimmu appointed from among his followers his Ministers of State, who ​in the time of peace formed his Government, and who composed his General Staff in the time of war. These offices were made hereditary in the families of the different functionaries.

This state of things continued till the time of the forty-ninth Emperor, Konin (A.D. 770–781), who decreed that these peaceful and military offices should be distinctly separate. This distinction was made probably by the fact that on the whole the country enjoyed long years of peace, and the civil government developed into importance as the settled life of the people gave sufficient chance for development of agriculture and trades. Moreover, it is to be remembered that the later extended growth of the military class in Japan only dates its beginning from this time.

During the reign of the fifty-sixth Emperor, Sewa (859–876), the precedent—which became customary under most of the succeeding Emperors—was made for the first time of entrusting to one of the Ministers of State the exercise of sovereign power in the name of the Emperor. This Emperor was only nine years old when he occupied the throne, and one of his Ministers of State from the Fujiwara family, or Fujiwara-no-Yoshifusa, was appointed Regent. According to Chapter V. of the present Imperial House Law, the Regency shall be assumed only by some member of the Imperial Family when the Emperor is under age.

In the eighth year of his reign, 866 (8th year of Tekwan), the Emperor issued a decree announcing that the exercise of sovereign power should henceforth be delegated to Yoshifusa, and that his successors should enjoy the hereditary privilege of being appointed Regent when the Emperor was a minor, and of Minister President when he was of age; even in the latter case the exercise of the sovereign power was delegated to them. The granting of these powers was probably caused by the very important rôle played by the Fujiwara family both at the Court and in the Government. This was really the beginning of the Shogunate régime. Some of the succeeding Emperors attempted to abolish this anomalous condition, but it was not until 1069–1072 that it was successfully achieved by the seventy-first Emperor, Go-Sanjo. The exercise of the sovereign power was then completely restored to the Emperor, and so continued till the reign of the seventy-ninth Emperor, Rokujo (1166–1168), although during these periods (1069–1167) the Emperors retiring from the throne assumed the right of tutorage over their successors. The Fujiwara family still enjoyed, though really only nominally, the position of Regent or Minister President as their hereditary right.

The military powers hitherto possessed by the Ministers of State were from the time of the Emperor Konin (770–781) ​gradually extended, and a military class sprang up which rapidly grew to occupy a powerful position. People of the Court and in the Government were losing their vigour, living amid the luxury, corruption, and intrigue which was increasing at the capital Kyoto during the centuries of peace, while the two principal military clans of Japan, the Taira and the Minamotos, descended from the Princes of the Imperial Family, were spreading the sphere of their influence over Japan, the former chiefly in the South, and the latter in the North and East. Certain disagreements arising at Court between the Emperor and his Minister of State on one hand, and the ex-Emperor and his Minister of State on the other, these two clans were called upon to help settle the dispute. The Taira clan assisted the new Emperor, Go-Shirakawa (1156–1158), and his Minister Fujiwara-no-Tedamichi, while most of the Minamoto clan joined with the ex-Emperor Sutoku (1124–1141) and his Minister Fujiwara-no-Yorinaga, and they carried on the war known as the war of Hogen (1156, 1st year of Hogen). The Minamotos being defeated on the field, the Taira clans occupied, naturally, more dominant positions at Court, and later in the war of Heji (1159, or 1st year of Heji) gained entire control over them. The influence of the Fujiwara family at Court then gave way to that of the Taira clan, and the Ministers of State were appointed from among their chief generals. During the reign of the Emperor Rokujo (1166–1168), in the year 1167 (2nd year of Ninnan), Taira-no-Kiyomori was appointed Minister President (Dajo-Daijin), and occupied the same position at Court and in the Government as the Fujiwara had formerly. This is considered the second step in the establishment of the Shogunate.

The civil and military supremacy of the Taira clan did not continue long, owing to their mismanagement of political affairs. During the reign of the eighty-first Emperor, Antoku (1180–1183), Minamoto-no-Yoritomo rose in the province of Izu, and waged war against the Taira (1180, 4th year of Jisho), to restore the military prestige lost by his clan; and at the famous naval battle of Dan-no-ura the Taira were utterly defeated (1185, or 1st year of Bunji). Then Yoritomo appealed to the Emperor (eighty-second Emperor, Go-Toba, 1183–1198) to give him sanction for establishing the military administration of Japan, as a military administration was the only system that could be adopted at that time for the restoration of peace and order in the country after it had suffered so many successive tumults by war.

The Emperor granted his request, and Yoritomo established his residence and seat of operations at Kamakura (province of Sagami), a situation which enabled him to hold the military ​command and to administer the Minamoto power throughout Japan. He established his leading retainers in the best strategic positions throughout the country, who acted as military Governors, and reported to Kamakura as the centre of military government. This system of administration introduced by Yoritomo was the foundation of that feudalism which prevailed in Japan for a period of more than seven centuries.

In the 3rd year of Kenkyu (1192) the Emperor was pleased to again appoint Yoritomo the ‘Sei-i Taishogun,’ or Commander-in-Chief, against the barbarians. The office of the ‘Sei-i Taishogun’ was first instituted by the fiftieth Emperor, Kwammu (782–805), who appointed Sakanoue-no-Tamuramaro to suppress the insurrection of the Aino tribes, who inhabited the northern part of the main island of Japan at that time. Again, in the reign of the fifty-second Emperor, Saga (810–823), Bunya-no-Watamaro was nominated to the same office for the same purpose. These are the only two instances which occurred before Yoritomo held the office, so the ‘Sei-i Taishogun’ was not therefore a hereditary office, but instituted temporarily when necessary to direct attack against the barbarians or to suppress the Ainos in their occasional insurrections. As the latter were completely subdued, however, before the time of Yoritomo, it had lost that significance, but was used in the sense of official designation of the chief controller of the military government, and was as such made hereditary to his successors. This word ‘Taishogun,’ contracted to its abbreviated form of ‘Shogun,’ began to be used in the time of Yoritomo to designate the holder of this position, and marks the real beginning of the Shogunate.

The feudal system of government was first established by Yoritomo, as has already been observed, and completed by Ashikaga Takauji, the first Shogun of the Ashikaga Shogunate (1338–1573), and finally perfected by Tokugawa Iyeyasu, the first Shogun of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1867). From those military Governors distributed by Yoritomo rose the later feudal lords, or ‘Daimyos,’ who rendered homage to their chief, or the Shogun. The Shogun held the position of Governor-General, who was appointed, and to whom the exercise of the sovereign power was granted, by the Emperor, and who enjoyed the office as a hereditary gift. When a Shogun died, he was succeeded by one of his sons, or his nearest kinsman, and the latter was appointed as Shogun by the contemporaneous Emperor, always with a definite ceremony. But as the strongest and most powerful of all the military class always assumed the supremacy over the rest, ​and was thus appointed Shogun or military Governor, so the occupant of the Shogunate could not be confined to the different generations of the same family. Moreover, the development of the military government produced many powerful ‘Daimyos,’ who possessed great numbers of retainers and large extents of land. At the end of the Ashikaga Shogunate, these ‘Daimyos’ from 1467 to 1590 fought amongst themselves for supremacy, until Toyotomi Hideyoshi, commonly known as Taiko, subdued the rest and restored peace and order in 1590. However, the struggle for supremacy soon flamed up again after his death, and his retainers on one hand, and the followers of Tokugawa Iyeyasu on the other, fought the Battle of Sekigahara (1600), which decided the final victory of the latter. The one hundred and seventh Emperor, Go-Yoze, applauded the great merit of Iyeyasu for having put an end to the long-prevalent state of warfare in the empire, and was pleased to appoint him the ‘Sei-i Taishogun’ in 1603 (8th year of Kecho): Thus, the Tokugawa Shogunate was established and its bases consolidated by the third Shogun, Iyemitsu, who summoned to the Castle of Yedo, now Tokyo, the so-called ‘Tozama Daimyos’—i.e., those Daimyos who were not his own retainers, but who had stood upon an equal footing with the Tokugawa from the time of Taiko, and made them all swear before him that they should thereafter render him homage in the same manner as his own retainers.

With the purpose of maintaining the perpetual peace and unity of the whole country, Iyeyasu and his successors eagerly aimed at the improvement of social life, and promoted as one of the means the art and learning which had long since been abandoned for military development on account of the successive wars. Besides this, the strict exclusion throughout the entire country from missionary influence was adopted as the best policy of avoiding complications occasioned by any political ambitions they would have undoubtedly developed: But the commerce with foreigners was never impeded on this account, but, rather, encouraged to as great an extent as possible, without allowing the missionaries to gain a footing in connection with it. The Dutch traders, who had no intention of propagating a religion, but were only intent upon developing the country, as the Chinese, were permitted for this reason to transact their mercantile affairs at the port of Nagasaki. Everything being thus put in order, peace prevailed throughout the country; people enjoyed a quiet and undisturbed life; learning developed, the arts flourished; cities and towns grew and prospered, and the current of progress and civilization ran with a new speed.

The Tokugawa’s policy for the pacification and unification ​of the country was so wisely adapted to the conditions of the times, and moved with such perfection and success, that it finally brought the military government and feudalism into dissolution—a very natural consequence. With the development of learning, the study of the history and the literature of Japan, together with the Chinese system of politico-ethics of Confucius and Mencius, was greatly extended. Several Daimyos encouraged their retainers to pursue learning, and Tokugawa Mitsukuni (born 1622, died 1700) accomplished the publication of his famous ‘Dai Nippon,’ or ‘The History of Great Japan.’ The origin and nature of the Shogunate became better known and understood by the increasing numbers of educated men, who began to doubt the necessity of continuing the state of military government. This sentiment was often expressed by the popular cry of ‘Kinno’—the restoration of the status quo of the Emperor’s rule—which originated at this time. The growth of the city also effected a great change in the economical condition of the country, and tended to weaken the basis of feudalism. Moreover, the financial state of the later Tokugawa Shogunate lost its fame and credit.

The eighth Shogun, Yoshimune (1716–1744), was a keen, fore-sighted statesman, and renewed in many respects the reputation of the Tokugawa Shogunate. One of his most remarkable merits was his endeavour to aid the progress of his country by introducing Western science and civilization. From 1720 (5th year of Kyoho) he permitted the importation of Dutch books concerning mathematics, astronomy, geography, medicine, botany, chemistry, etc., except those relating to the Christian religion. He encouraged at the same time the study of the Dutch language, and ordered scholars to publish the translation of important Dutch books. Many of the Daimyos followed his example, and a better understanding of the state and condition of Europe was secured.

During the period from 1792 to 1853 (4th year of Kwanse to 6th year of Kaye), besides the Dutch, the visits of foreign vessels—chiefly English and Russian—became more frequent, and Japan’s attention was directed towards coast defence. When the disturbances occurred in the North with the Russian adventurers in 1806 and 1807 (3rd and 4th year of Bunk), and the English man-of-war Phaeton abruptly appeared off Nagasaki in 1808 (5th year of Bunkwa), the mind of the entire nation was turned to the question of Japan’s integrity from foreign ambition. This feeling was often expressed by the cry of ‘Joi’ (expulsion of the ambitious foreigners) which arose at this time. The Dutch system of military discipline was adopted in 1837 (8th year of Tempo), and was soon adopted by all the principal Daimyos, Tokugawa of Mito, Shimazu of ​Satsuma, Nabeshima of Hizeu, etc. After 1849 (2nd year of Kaye) the warships were constructed after European (Dutch) methods. Tokugawa Nariaki of Mito earnestly endeavoured, among other Daimyos like Shimazu, to introduce Western civilization into the country. He employed for the first time the design of our present national flag, which was promptly accepted by the Government. Moreover, iron factories for manufacturing firearms, and cotton-mills after the Dutch pattern, were founded. William II. of the Netherlands sent two messages to the Government—one in 1844 (1st year of Kokwa), the second in 1852 (5th year of Kaye)—demonstrating the benefit to be derived from opening the country to international relations, and predicting in the latter message that the Americans would probably adopt strong measures to that effect. The Shogun’s Government, on the whole, was inclined from the start to settle matters peacefully, but, in regard to the opening of the country, the various opinions among the statesmen and politicians were very conflicting.

This was the general condition of things in Japan before the arrival of the American fleet in 1853 (6th year of Kaye): Progress and civilization were already advancing before the presence of foreigners in Japan, and the gradual change of the Governmental system was well under way. Advantageous changes were not so rapidly and decisively carried out then as after the Restoration, but the flame of the new epoch in our national history was already burning, and the Americans only, as it were, poured oil on, and so accentuated a conflagration which was gradually consuming the feudalism and military government.

In 1853 (6th year of Kaye) Commodore Perry arrived off the harbour of Uraga with a fleet consisting of two men-of-war and two transports, and demanded that the Governor of the harbour should meet the diplomatic representatives of his Government. The Governor instructed him to negotiate all such matters at Nagasaki, the place appointed for all negotiation concerning foreign intercourse. But Commodore Perry insisted upon his demands, and threatened to dash at once with his fleet to Yedo, now Tokyo, if his proposal were rejected. The Governor was at once appointed as a proper representative of the Government to settle the question. He met with Perry at Kuri-gahama, and received there the letter from the President of the United States. Perry soon abandoned the harbour, leaving word that he would return the following year to receive a definite answer from the Japanese Government, and threatened at the same time to bombard the city if the proposed treaty should not receive sanction. What the real intent of Perry was in making such a demonstration we do not know, but, as far as ​his action itself was concerned, his menace only caused a great indignation throughout the whole country.

Among the Shogun’s Government, and also amongst outside politicians, two antagonistic opinions were struggling against each other concerning the settlement of this grave question—one in favour of the enclosure of ports against foreign ambition, termed ‘Sako,’ the other in favour of opening the country to international relations, termed ‘Kaikoku.’ The former maintained that the national peril should be coped with after the manner of Iyeyasu, who closed up all the ports of Japan in order to check the secret entrance and venomous attempts of the Spanish and Portuguese missionaries; the other opinion was that Japan’s integrity could be best secured by the opening of the country, and that her practical isolation from all international relations was opposed to the development of civilization, and hence unfavourable to her national interests and progress. Both parties had naturally the same purpose to accomplish, but in regard to its execution one was negative, the other positive.

The late Emperor Komei (1847–1867) and the greatest part of his Court were inclined to the former opinion, and, indeed, the enclosure of the ports was the predominant opinion of the country.

In 1854 (1st year of Ansei) Commodore Perry entered the harbour of Uraga with a more powerful fleet than in the preceding year. The Shogun’s Government did not wish to endanger the country by entering into a conflict with the Americans, and the preliminary convention of friendship and commerce was concluded at Kanagawa in 1854 between the plenipotentiaries of Japan and of the United States of America. Similar conventions were signed by the representatives of Japan on the one hand, and those of Great Britain in 1854, of Russia in 1855, and of Holland in 1836, on the other. The Shogun’s Government acted entirely against the public opinion of the people, and its credit and reputation began to fall.

When the negotiations for concluding a new treaty with the United States of America began in 1858 (5th year of Ansel), a strong opposition against its draft sprang up, even from the inner circle of the Shogun’s Government and among the most powerful of the Daimyos, all of whom could not consent to the existence of extraterritorial jurisdiction in Japan. They brought up the question with so much vigour that they began to dispute about the extent to which the Shogun was accredited by the Emperor with the exercise of the sovereign power. Being unable to resist the public tendency, the thirteenth Shogun, Iyesada (1854–1858), begged the Emperor’s own decision of the matter. But before any definite decision was given him ​by the Emperor, the ‘Tairo’ Ii Naosuke (one of the Princes in the Shogun’s Government), the present Count Ii’s grandfather, concluded on his own responsibility the new treaties with the United States of America, 1858, and successively with Holland, Russia, Great Britain, and France. The Emperor Komei was vehemently irritated by this action, and so were the opponents of Ii. The treaties remained, therefore, practically speaking, unratified until the Emperor was reconciled later to the giving of his formal consent.

Coincidently the selection of the Shogun’s heir was acutely discussed between the ‘Tairo’ Ii and the principal Daimyos of the Tokugawa’s family. The Emperor was again appealed to for the final decision. When the fourteenth Shogun, Iyemochi (1859–1866), succeeded to the office, it was utterly against the will of the Emperor and of a large number of Daimyos, such as the Daimyos of Mito, Owari, Yechizen, Tosa, Uwajima, etc. The Shogun and his Government now stood quite isolated, even from the Daimyos of his own family, and the cry of ‘Kinno’ (‘honour the Emperor’) became popular throughout the country. The abolition of the Shogunate was much thought of from this time (1858) among the patriots of Japan. The reconciliation between the Emperor and the Shogun seemed very difficult until the marriage of the Emperor’s sister, Her Imperial Highness the Princess Kazu-no-Miya, with the Shogun Iyemochi, which was sanctioned by the Emperor in 1861 (1st year of Bunkyu).

This marriage aimed at an alliance between the Emperor and the Shogun in order to sustain the Shogun’s power under the auspices of the Emperor, and was called ‘Kobu Gattai.’ The result of this policy was, however, to cause the immediate fall of the Shogunate.

The dawn of the Restoration broke when the Shogun’s Government became the centre of public enmity. Its failure in both internal and external politics produced the greatest dissatisfaction throughout the country. The majority of the Daimyos and the Samurais ardently longed for the restoration of the ancient state of the Emperor’s rule. The Emperor Komei and his Court also inclined to the abolishment of the Shogunate. Such Daimyos as Shimazu of Satsuma, Mori of Choshiu, Yamanouchi of Tosa, and others whose forefathers had stood upon an equal footing with Tokugawa, would no longer recognise the supremacy of the latter. All of them endeavoured to occupy an equal position with Tokugawa in the Emperor’s rule. Preparations to carry out this plan had been begun long ​before the rise of the schism within the Shogun’s Government. They introduced, as has been stated, to a great extent the elements of Western civilization, and trained their troops after the European system, thus preparing, if necessary, to enforce their demands against the Shogunate. Shimazu and Mori first sought to establish a close connection with the Emperor’s Court. A mutual relationship existed between them and the courtiers, amongst them Sanjo, father-in-law of the present Prince Sanjo; Iwakura, father of the present Prince Iwakura; and others who also cherished the idea of abolishing the Shogunate. They all supported the cause of the Emperor in the national aspiration of abolishing the Shogunate, and amending its dishonourable concession to the foreigners. The seat of the Imperial Government was then, in 1862 (2nd year of Bunkyu), filled with patriots from every part of Japan, who gathered themselves near the palace to persuade the Emperor to assume in himself the exercise of the sovereign power. Shimazu and Mori began to take independent action, and entered Kyoto with their respective troops, alleging as an excuse the desire, if necessary, of suppressing the confusion surrounding the Emperor. The same policy was soon followed by Yamanouchi of Tosa. This was really the first opportunity given them to play a prominent rôle in the Restoration. The untiring energy of Iwakura and Sanjo at last obtained an Imperial decree ordering Shimazu and Mori to admonish the Shogun’s Government to change the tone of its foreign policy. Another decree was issued at the same time to the Shogun Iyemochi, and in consequence a decisive measure of reformation was obtained in his Government. The exercise of the sovereign power was thus practically restored to the Emperor, and the Shogun stood in the difficult position of having to choose between expelling the foreigners or disobeying the Emperor’s decree. This well-schemed plan was thought out by the eminent politicians of the time, Saigo, Okubo, Kido, Goto, and many others, assisted by such courtiers as Iwakura. The success of this plan was followed by a long period of indecision on the part of the Shogunate Government. Popular tumults rose against them, and many Daimyos withdrew their allegiance as faithful allies.

Ultimately temporary success was, however, gained by the Shogun in 1863 (3rd year of Bunkyu). The troops of Choshiu were driven out of Kyoto, and those of Aizu Matsudaira, one of the Shogun’s faithful followers, occupied its place. Sanjo and six other courtiers fled to Mori’s province, and the even balance between the Shogun and the anti-Shogun parties was thus established at the Emperor’s Court.

Iyemochi, however, not fully satisfied with this successful ​establishment of his authority, was always anxious to demonstrate his power. He found a pretext in Mori’s independent action against foreign vessels at Shimonoseki, 1863, and appealed to the Emperor for sanction to carry out his first campaign in 1864 (1st year of Genji) against Mori, hoping at the same time to suppress the ambitions of the other Daimyo by a war against him. This campaign ended successfully for him, but he suffered a great defeat in his second campaign, undertaken in 1866 (2nd year of Keio), against the advice of his own statesmen, Matsudaria of Yechizen, etc., and the fall of the military supremacy of the Shogunate Tokugawa dates from this time. A great many of the Daimyos utterly refused to obey the Shogun’s commands. He died in the midst of great calamity at Osaka in 1866 (2nd year of Keio). The fifteenth Shogun, Keiki, soon succeeded him, and was appointed the Sei-i Taishogun. At the end of the same year the Emperor Komei died, to the great regret of the whole nation, without being able to reap the fruit of the Restoration, which had been planted during his hard reign in both internal and external relations. The throne was immediately inherited by the present Emperor.

The Shogun was declared at this time by the majority of the Daimyos to be incapable of being vested with the authority of the sovereign power, as his predecessors had so singularly failed in foreign affairs, and had entirely lost both civil and military power. Yamanouchi of Tosa and Asano of Aki advised the Shogun Keiki to resign his office. As such politicians as Goto of Tosa, Komatsu and Okubo of Satsuma, and others, and Katsu of his own Government, persuaded him to the same course, he finally decided upon it. On the 14th of October, 1867 (4th day of the 10th month of the 3rd year of Keio), the Shogun Keiki confirmed his decision, and appealed to the Emperor to grant him the resignation from his office, which was promptly accepted on the following day. This is a memorable day in the history of New Japan, for from this day the present Emperor de facto assumed in himself the exercise of the sovereign power, and the Imperial Government was restored to the state that had already existed before the fifty-sixth Emperor, Seiwa, in 859–876. This is the reason of its being called the ‘Restoration.’

All the Daimyos of Japan, particularly Matsudaira of Yechizen, Nabeshima of Hizen, Yamanouchi of Tosa, Date and Shimazu of Satsuma, were summoned to Kyoto to form a Council of State for the organization of the new Government. Mori of Choshiu was released, and Sanjo and other courtiers were called back to Kyoto. The troops of Satsuma, Aki, and Choshiu, and later those of Tosa, Owari, and ​Yechizen, entered Kyoto to guard the Emperor’s seat of government.

With the dismissal of the Aizu and Kuwana troops from the Imperial escort, the Sei-i Taishogun and all other offices of the old Government were at once abolished on the 9th of December, 1867 (9th day of the 12th month of the 3rd year of Keio). The new offices of Sosai (Minister President), Gijo (State Ministers), and San-yo (State Councillors), were created on the same day. His Imperial Highness the Prince Taruhito Arisagawa was appointed the Sosai. The office of Gijo was occupied by the Prince of the Imperial Family, the courtiers Sanjo, Iwakura, etc., and the principal Daimyos—Shimazu, Tokugawa of Owari, Asano, Matsudaira of Yechizen, Yamanouchi, and Date; and the office of San-yo by the ablest politicians of that time—Iwakura, Saigo, Kido, Goto, and others. The basis of the new Government was thus consolidated by the fusion of the old anti-Shogun parties. The Restoration was on this day brought up to its perfect working order. One of the most marked features of the new form of Government was the fact that the offices of the new Administration were not made hereditary, and not limited to certain families, as had always been the case.

The old Shogun parties—that is, the faithful followers of the old Shogun, as the Matsudairas of Aizu and Kuwana—were greatly dissatisfied with this decisive reformation, maintaining that it had been planned by the ambitious Shimazu and Mori. The rivalry between the troops of these four Daimyos grew more and more bitter until the war of 1868–69 broke forth as its inevitable consequence. This war began at Kyoto, extended over the north-eastern part of Japan, and finally ended with the Battle of Hakodate in 1869 (2nd year of Meiji). Had the foresighted statesmen of the old Shogun’s Government, like Katsu and Okubo, not provided for the settlement of diverse difficulties which arose after the Keiki’s resignation from his office, the disasters of the war would have been far greater than they were.

The new Government, after peace and order had been fully restored, took rapid and decisive steps to promote the well-being and civilization of the country.

The process of development followed since the Restoration is too well known to need description in so short a sketch as this, but before closing it is well to mention the following points:

1. The feudal system of Japan did not cease at the same moment as the abolition of the Shogunate, but remnants of it still existed at the beginning of the new Government. However, all Daimyos, particularly Shimazu, Mori, Yamanouchi, Nabeshima, Tokugawa of Owari, Hosokawa, Ikeda, and ​Hachisuka of Awa, had unanimously come to the conclusion that the existence of feudalism weakened the elasticity of the whole nation and impeded its progress. Consequently, they unanimously appealed to the Emperor to abolish the feudal system. The Imperial decree to this effect was issued in 1871 (4th year of Meiji), and put an end to the distinction of the military class over all others at the same time.

2. The foreign policy of the new Government was determined by the Imperial decree of 1868 (1st year of Meiji), and Japan entered into international relationships. The abolition of the existence of the extraterritorial jurisdiction in Japan, which for long had been the object of discontent to the entire nation, was one of the principal objects of the new Government, the disagreeable abuses of such jurisdiction having produced several fanatic attempts on the part of the people against foreigners, both before and after the Restoration. The negotiations for the revision of the old treaties with the United States of America were first entered upon in 1871 (4th year of Meiji), when the present Emperor was pleased to send his first Special Mission to all the treaty Powers of Europe and America. These negotiations with other Powers continued through a long series of years, until the revised treaty on an equal footing was first signed between Japan and Great Britain in 1894 (on the 16th day of the 7th month of the 27th year of Meiji), and successively between the other nations of Europe and America, with the exception of Mexico, with which country the treaty already existing since 1888 (21st year of Meiji) was on an equal footing. This action of the British Government was the beginning of those relations between Japan and Great Britain which have developed into those of a nation amie et alliée.

3. Since Japan’s experience with the old Spanish and Portuguese missionaries, the propagation of the Christian religion was strictly prohibited until 1872 (5th year of Meiji), when it was tolerated for the first time. Missionaries came in succession from several countries, and established churches and schools. Many people became converts, but many of the missionaries did not understand the well-known saying, ‘At Rome do as Rome does,’ and the consequence was that its assimilation was retarded by their inadaptability. The perfect freedom of religious belief is now assured by Article 28 of the Constitution, yet the greater part of the educated classes do not appreciate the missionaries in general, and this lack of sympathy must necessarily greatly influence the future development of the Christian religion in Japan.