Metaphysics (Ross, 1908)/Book 7

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Chapter 1

There are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words;^[1] for in one sense the 'being' meant is 'what a thing is' or the individual thing, and in another sense it means that a thing is of a certain quality or quantity or has some such predicate asserted of it. While 'being' has all these senses, obviously that which 'is' primarily is the 'what', which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or beautiful,^[2] but not that it is three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is, we do not say 'white' or 'hot' or 'three cubits long', but 'man' or 'God'. And all other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which is in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other determination of it. And so one might raise the question whether walking and being healthy and sitting are, each of them, existent or non-existent, and similarly in any other case of this sort; for none of them is either self-subsistent or capable of being separated from substance, but rather, if anything, it is that which walks or is seated or is healthy that is an existent thing. Now these are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them; and this is the substance or individual, which is implied in such a predicate; for 'good' or 'sitting' apart from that which sits or is good has no meaning. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others is. Therefore that which is primarily and is simply (not 'is something') must be substance.

Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first; but substance is first in every sense — (1) in formula, ​(2) in order of knowledge, (3) in time. For (3) of the other categories none can exist independently, but only substance. And (1) in formula also this is first; for in the formula of each term the formula of its substance must be present. And (2) we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g. what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or where it is; since we know each of these predicates also, only when we know what the quantity or the quality is.

And indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is, is just the question, what is substance? For it is this that some assert to be one, others more than one, and that some assert to be limited in number, others unlimited. And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which is in this sense.

Chapter 2

Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that both animals and plants and their parts are substances, and so are natural bodies such as fire and water and earth and everything of the sort, and all things that are parts of these or composed of these (either of parts or of the whole bodies), e.g. the heaven and its parts, stars and moon and sun. But whether these alone are substances, or there are also others, or only some of these, or some of these and some other things^[3] are substances, or none of these but only some other things, must be considered. Some think the limits of body, i.e. surface, line, point, and unit, are substances, and more so than body or the solid.

Further, some do not think there is anything substantial besides sensible things, but others think there are eternal substances which are more in number and more real, e.g. Plato posited two kinds of substance — the Forms and the objects of mathematics — as well as a third kind, viz. the substance of ​

sensible bodies. And Speusippus made still more kinds of substance, beginning with the One, and making principles for each kind of substance, one for numbers, another for spatial magnitudes, and then another for the soul; and in this way he multiplies the kinds of substance. And some say Forms and numbers have the same nature, and other things come after them, e.g. lines and planes, until we come to the substance of the material universe and to sensible bodies.

Regarding these matters, then, we must inquire which of the common statements are right and which are not right, and what things are substances, and whether there are or are not any besides sensible substances, and how sensible substances exist, and whether there is a separable substance (and if so why and how) or there is no substance separable from sensible substances; and we must first sketch the nature of substance.

Chapter 3

The word 'substance' is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the universal and the genus are thought to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum. Now the substratum is that of which the others are predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else. And so we must first determine the nature of this; for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance. And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third sense, the compound of these. By the matter I mean, for instance, the bronze, by the shape the plan of its form, and by the compound of these (the concrete thing) the statue. Therefore if the form is prior to the matter and more real, the compound of both will be prior also for the same reason.

We have now outlined the nature of substance, showing that it is that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated. But we must not merely state the matter thus; for this is not enough. The statement ​itself is obscure, and further, on this view, matter becomes substance. For if this is not substance, it is beyond our power to say what else is. When all else is taken away evidently nothing but matter remains. For of the other elements some are affections, products, and potencies of bodies, while length, breadth, and depth are quantities and not substances. For a quantity is not a substance; but the substance is rather that to which these belong primarily. But when length and breadth and depth are taken away we see nothing left except that which is bounded by these, whatever it be; so that to those who consider the question thus matter alone must seem to be substance. By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, so that its being^[4] is different from that of each of the predicates; for the predicates other than substance are predicated of substance, while substance is predicated of matter. Therefore the ultimate substratum is of itself neither a particular thing nor of a particular quantity nor otherwise positively characterized; nor yet negatively, for negations also will belong to it only by accident.

If we adopt this point of view, then, it follows that matter is substance. But this is impossible; for both separability and individuality are thought to belong chiefly to substance. And so form and the compound of form and matter would be thought to be substance, rather than matter. The substance compounded of both, i.e. of matter and shape, may be dismissed; for it is posterior and its nature is obvious. And matter also is in a sense manifest. But we must inquire into the third kind of substance; for this is the most difficult.

It is agreed that there are some substances among sensible things, so that we must look first among these. For it is an advantage to advance to that which is more intelligible. For learning proceeds for all in this way — through that which is less intelligible by nature to that which is more intelligible; and just as in conduct our work is to start from what is good for each and make what is good in itself good for each, so it ​is our work to start from what is more intelligible to oneself and make what is intelligible by nature intelligible to oneself. Now what is intelligible and primary for particular sets of people is often intelligible to a very small extent, and has little or nothing of reality. But yet one must start from that which is barely intelligible but intelligible to oneself, and try to understand what is intelligible in itself, passing, as has been said, by way of those very things which one understands.

Chapter 4

Since at the start we distinguished the various marks by which we determine substance, and one of these was thought to be the essence, we must investigate this. And first let us make some abstract linguistic remarks about it. The essence of each thing is what it is said to be propter se^[5]. For being you is not being musical; for you are not by your very nature musical. What, then, you are by your very nature is your essence.

But not the whole of this is the essence of a thing; not that which it is propter se as a surface is propter se white, because being a surface is not identical with being white. But again the combination of both — 'being a white surface' ^[6] — is not the essence of surface. Why? Because 'surface' itself is repeated. The formula, therefore, in which the term itself is not present but its meaning is expressed, this is the formula of the essence of each thing. Therefore if to be a white surface is to be a smooth surface ^[7], to be white and to be smooth are one and the same.^[8]

But since there are compounds of substance with the other categories (for there is a substrate for each category, e.g. for quality, quantity, time, place, and motion), we must inquire whether there is a formula of the essence of each of them, i.e. whether to these compounds also there belongs an essence, ​e.g. to white man the essence of white man. Let the compound be denoted by ' X '.^[9] What is the essence of X? But, it may be said, this also is not a propter se expression. We reply that there are just two ways in which a predicate may fail to be true of a subject propter se, and one of these results from the addition, and the other from the omission, of a determinant. One kind of predicate is not propter se because the term that is being defined is combined with another determinant, e.g. if in defining the essence of white one were to state the formula of white man; another because in the subject another determinant is combined with that which is expressed in the formula, e.g. if X meant white man, and one were to define X as white; white man is white indeed, but its essence is not to be white.^[10] But is being-X an essence at all? Probably not.'^[11] For the essence is an individual type; but when an attribute is asserted of an alien subject, the complex is not an individual type, e.g. white man is not an individual type, since individuality belongs only to substances.^[12] Therefore there is an essence only of those things whose formula is a definition. But we have a definition not where we have a word and a formula identical in meaning (for in that case all formulae or sets of words would be definitions; for there will be some name for any set of words whatever, so that even the Iliad would be a definition^[13]), but where there is a formula of something primary; and primary things are those which do not imply the predication of one element in them of another, alien element. Nothing, then, which is not a species of a genus will have an essence — only species will have it, for in these the subject is not thought to participate in the attribute and to have it as an affection,^[14] nor to have it by accident; but for everything else as well, if it has a name, there will be a formula of its meaning — viz. that this attribute belongs to this subject; ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/148 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/149 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/150 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/151 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/152 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/153 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/154 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/155 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/156 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/157 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/158 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/159 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/160 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/161 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/162 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/163 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/164 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/165 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/166 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/167 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/168 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/169 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/170 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/171 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/172 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/173 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/174 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/175 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/176 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/177 ​Page:Metaphysics by Aristotle Ross 1908 (deannotated).djvu/178