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Squadron, 9th Cavalry of the 1st Cavalry Division began an extensive aerial reconnaissance of the A Shau Valley to select flight routes, locate antiaircraft and artillery weapons, and to develop targets for tactical air and B-52 strikes. During the period 14 to 19 April, over 100 B-52 strikes, 200 Air Force and Marine fighter sorties, and numerous aerial rocket artillery missions were flown against targets in the valley. The 1st Brigade of the 101st Airborne Division and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force were moved into pre-assault positions ready to make a separate attack on D-day east of the A Shau.
The 101st Airborne Division's role in Operation DELAWARE was to complement the 1st Cavalry Division's assault into the valley itself. The 1st Brigade of the 101st, in coordination with the 3d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force, was to conduct ground and airmobile assaults to interdict the enemy's routes of withdrawal and infiltration in the area around the junction of Routes 547 and 547A. The 101st Airborne Division's Fire Support Base BASTOGNE, far to the east on Route 547, would just be able to reach the north end of the A Shau Valley with its long range 175-mm guns. The Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force was to be responsible for clearing Route 547A.
Operation DELAWARE was to be a coordinated airmobile and ground attack on two axes using elements of three divisions—the 1st Cavalry, the 101st Airborne, and the 1st Army of the Republic of Vietnam Division. One prong was to be the attack along and astride Routes 547 and 547A, while the main attack was the assault into A Luoi and Ta Bat on the valley floor.
Operation DELAWARE differed from PEGASUS in that during PEGASUS the Cavalry Division had control of all U.S. ground tactical elements. Operation DELAWARE was under the tactical control of Provisional Corps, and my relationship with the 101st Airborne Division was one of coordination. I had also expected to have the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Airborne Task Force as part of our maneuver force, but this unit was shifted to the operational area of the 101st during the latter planning stages. D-day had been tentatively set for 17 April, but I made the condition that it was really contingent on my having three full days of operations in the A Shau Valley by the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry in coordination with tactical air and B-52 Arc Light strikes. The purpose of this effort was to determine and neutralize the heavy enemy antiaircraft concentrations.
By the 16th of April, the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry still had not had three full days of good weather to operate in the valley, so