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AIRMOBILITY


committed to the action. However, this aircraft complicated the planning on armed helicopter support, for the older Huey could not keep up with, or perform as well as, the preferred Cobra.

With all its limitations, the armed helicopter proved the most important fire-support weapons system during LAMSON 719. Armed helicopters provided the capability for detecting and immediately engaging battlefield targets of opportunity close to friendly troops on the ground—a system unmatched by any other weapons system in the United States inventory. Armed helicopters, operating with the air cavalry, aerial rocket artillery, and escorting troop-lift, heavy-lift, and support aircraft, literally covered the battle area with their ability to respond immediately and accurately with their fire against known and suspected enemy weapons and positions. Armed helicopters often operated under low ceilings and weather conditions that restricted or precluded use of tactical air in close support of ground units or airmobile operations. Armed helicopters, particularly those of the air cavalry, played a key role in acquiring targets, directing artillery fire and tactical air strikes against them, and conducting battle damage assessments.

One can not overstate the importance of the air cavalry in this operation. They seemed to be omnipresent; they found most of the targets; and they were generally the first on the scene and the last to leave. All that I have said before about the merits of this organization was exemplified in Laos.

Air cavalry performed two principal missions during LAMSON 719—reconnaissance to the flanks and front of ground operations and reconnaissance and security of landing zones before and during combat assaults and extractions. Lieutenant Colonel Robert F. Molinelli, the Commanding Officer, 2d Squadron, 17th Cavalry was the principal reconnaissance officer for the operation.[1] Directing his four air cavalry troops, he took his assigned tasks directly from the Commanding General, I Corps, and delivered his reports back through both Army of the Republic of Vietnam and U.S. channels.[2] This system of assigning tasks and multiplicity of reporting channels testifies to the critical role played by the Air Cavalry. As the battle progressed it became evident that, because of their great confidence in the Air Cavalry, the Vietnamese units tended


  1. ↑ To be replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Archie A. Rider on 5 March.
  2. ↑ Colonel Molinelli put it this way: "I took my directions directly from General Lam, with General Sutherland supervising our operations on a daily basis. He (General Sutherland) was pretty much the on-the-scene commander until the combined tactical command post was established at Khe Sanh."
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