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independence of the judiciary. It was in connection with the trial of the man who assaulted and wounded the Czarewitch (now Czar) of Russia at Otsu in 1891. An attempt was made to consider it a special case for political purposes. But the court stood firm to judge the case purely from the legal point of view and condemned the assailant, not to capital punishment (as desired by the Government), but to life imprisonment, which was the maximum punishment by law in such a case. Satoh adds:
This was not only a technical point of thrilling importance, but was indeed a landmark of great prominence in the path of Japan’s progress as a constitutional nation. Here the principle of entire independence of the judiciary from the executive was permanently and most conspicuously established.
There is one more important provision, in Article LIX, that
trials and judgments of a Court shall be conducted publicly.
When, however, there exists any fear, that such publicity may be prejudicial to peace and order, or to the maintenance of public morality, the public trial may be suspended by provision of law or by the decision of the Court of Law.
It is important to note that the Japanese judiciary has no power to interpret the Constitution. Such power, as has been pointed out in preceding sections, resides entirely with the Emperor.
Moreover, the ordinary Japanese court of law has no jurisdiction, according to Article LXI, in any
suit at law, which relates to rights alleged to have been infringed by the illegal measures of the administrative authorities, and which shall come within the competency of the Court of Administrative Litigation specially established by law.
This leads Uyehara[1] to make the following comment:
- ↑ Op. cit., p. 132.
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