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the material facts stated therein, and alledging, that at the time the appellant was presented by him, he had, as he believed, good right to present him, and that therefore the appellant ought to have the full effect and benefit of his presentation, and that he had no objection thereto in ease the court should decree the same.

The Bishop also put in his answer, and thereby submitted to act as the Court should direct.

The cause being at issue, and witnesses examined, and publication passed, came on to be heard before the Lord Chancellor, Bathurst, on the 6th of March 1775, when his Lordship was pleased to order, that a case should be made for the opinion of the judges of his Majesty's Court of Common Pleas, on the following question: "Whether the said letter or instrument be a good and effectual revocation of the presentation in law?"

A case was accordingly made, and the judges of that Court, on the 15th of November 1775, certified their opinion, "that the said letter or instrument was a good and effectual revocation of the presentation in law."

In consequence of this certificate, the cause was again brought to hearing for further directions, on the 3d of February 1776, when his Lordship, on the foundation of the said certificate, was pleased to order (as is usual in the like cases) that the appellant's bill should stand dismissed, but without costs to any of the respondents, except the Bishop, who was to be paid his costs by the appellant.

From this decree Mr. Rogers appealed; and on his behalf it was argued, (A. Wedderburn, G. Hill) that the title to the advowson of the rectory in question, was, before the execution of the deeds of February 1764, in [121] the respondent Smith, and was admitted by all parties to have been so. The gross fraud in obtaining those deeds so manifestly appeared from the facts above stated, all which were clearly proved in the cause, that the whole transaction must be esteemed fraud apparent; and in such a case, the constant practice of Courts of Equity is, to set aside the conveyances, without directing a trial at law, and to order them to stand as a security only for the money advanced, and interest. But if there was any doubt whether that transaction was fraudulent or not as it stood originally, that doubt was removed by the respondent Thomas Holled's afterwards giving a further sum of 1000 guineas, besides agreeing to pay all the costs of various suits both at law and in equity; which was the strongest admission, on his part, of the fraud and invalidity of his title under the conveyance of 1764. Conveyances obtained as that was, are considered in equity in the same light as mortgages, so far as to secure the repayment of the consideration money and interest; but in all other respects are much less favoured. The established practice of Courts of Equity, in restraining mortgagees of advowsons from presenting, is founded on clear reasons, applying with equal force against a claim to present by virtue of a conveyance in terms absolute and irredeemable, but attended with circumstances changing its equitable operation, to a security for the money advanced, and interest; and it would be a strange reverse of the rules of equity, to allow a privilege to persons obtaining by fraud, securities on advowsons, or conveyances operating as such, which is denied to those who obtain them without fraud, or any other imputation whatever.

But it was said, that the appellant's claim was founded on the presentation of the respondent Smith, which was afterwards revoked by the instrument of the 12th of December 1769. That instrument however was not a revocation of the former presentation, because a presentation to an ecclesiastical benefice, being once duly made by any subject as patron, is not revocable by such patron; especially after the same has been delivered by him to the presentee, who has therewith attended the diocesan, and duly prayed admission, institution, and induction thereon. It is true, the opinions of the judges on the general question, whether a presentation is revocable or not, are inconsistent; but the strongest reasons are against a revocation in general. Admitting however, that a presentation is in general revocable by a patron before institution; yet, under the circumstances of this case, the instrument of the 12th of December 1769 was not a revocation of the former presentation; 1st, Because it appeared by the recitals in that instrument, that the motive or consideration for making it was the deed of bargain and sale executed immediately previous thereto; which deed was obtained for an inadequate