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That should the appellant have cut down the wood, without knowing the right he had to it, he would subject himself to an action, which might be brought after the Earl's death, and when he could not have the aid of the Earl to make out his title, if he had one; and if his Lordship's title to the wood was not good, the appellant could have no remedy for recovering the money he had paid, in case his Lordship should not leave assets, and even if he did, it might be difficult to find them. That the prayer of the bill was conceived to be just; for if the Earl had sufficient power to sell the woods, it was against conscience for the Lord Altham and the other respondents to set up groundless pretensions, in prejudice of the appellant's right under the Earl; and if, on the other hand, the Earl had no power to sell the woods, it was but reasonable that he should relinquish any claim to the purchase-money; and not force the appellant to pay the money, and have him engaged in a law-suit, which might eventually ruin him: it was therefore highly necessary for the appellant, before he proceeded to cut the wood, to know what right he had to cut it; and this he could not do, otherwise than by a suit in equity. If the Lord Chancellor had been of opinion, that this right to the wood ought rather to have been tried at law than in equity, his Lordship might have ordered the appellant to have cut a tree, and the parties who alledged they had the property in it to have brought an action within a limited time; and on failure, to have granted the appellant a perpetual injunction against them: or, he might have directed an issue, to try whether Earl James, the brother of the respondent Earl Arthur, had power to devise the lands on which the woods grew; so that it might thereby appear, whether Earl Arthur was tenant for life only or not. As to the objection that the appellant was no real purchaser, but that his agreement was colourable only, and that therefore the Court should do nothing to aid him; it was answered, that there was no proof in the cause [221] on which to ground any such surmise. The agreement did not import that any money was paid, and therefore it could not be incumbent upon the appellant to prove the payment of any money; but having proved the execution of the deed, he had done all that was necessary in the cause. Admitting, however, that this suit was really brought to try the Earl of Anglesey's right to cut the woods, it was conceived that there was no just reason to dismiss the bill; for since the Earl had an intention to out the wood, and it was disputed whether he had a right so to do, it was fit the right should be determined before the wood was out; for by this means the wood might be preserved, if the Earl had no right to cut it, and expensive suits at law prevented, where very unequal damages might be given. Besides, by the constant practice of Courts of Equity, to grant injunctions to stay the cutting of wood, they necessarily bring the title into question. That costs were given to the respondents Lord Altham and Mr. Bayley, although they confessed giving the disturbance to the appellant, which he complained of in his bill, and insisted upon titles which neither of them proved, and consequently had altogether failed in their defence; although the Court had, in some measure, relieved the appellant against them, by giving him liberty to make use of those depositions, which proved Knockangarrow and Camolin-park to be the same lands. That if the appellant was not entitled to relief against the other respondents, he seemed to be clearly entitled to relief against the Earl of Anglesey; for if the appellant had no right to the woods, the Earl could have no right to the £5000 purchase-money; and yet the bill was dismissed as against his Lordship with costs, and the appellant was left to recover that money as he could. Whereas, if what was surmised by the Court, and seemed to be the main foundation of the decree, was true, viz. that the agreement was only colourable, and set up merely to try the Earl's title, his Lordship ought, in that case, rather to pay the appellant his costs, than receive costs from him. It was therefore hoped, that this decree of dismission would be reversed.

On the part of the respondent the Earl it was said (P. Yorke), that having by his answer admitted the agreement with the appellant for the sale of the woods, and having proved his title thereto, he ought to have a full performance of that agreement, which he was ready and willing to perform on his part. The other respondents printed no case against this appeal, nor did they either put in an answer to it, or appear at the hearing.

And therefore, after hearing counsel for the appellant, and the respondent the