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to the respondent Beckford, for principal, interest, and costs; and if that was not sufficient, then so much as should be wanting to make up what should be due for such principal, interest, and costs, was to be paid to the respondent Beckford, by the receiver in the said cause Chetwynd against Chetwynd, out of the money that should be in his hands, over and above what was or should be allowed for the appellant's maintenance, and all other just allowances; and thereupon it was ordered, that the respondent Beckford should assign the said mortgage to trustees, to be appointed according to the order of the 17th of January 1736, and procure all proper parties to join in such assignment.

On the 4th of March 1740, the appellant attained his age of twenty-one; and on the 4th of November 1741, the Master made a further report, in pursuance of the order of the 20th December 1739, and thereby certified, that there would be due to the respondent Beckford on his mortgage, on the 10th of January 1741, £7689 1s. 3¼d.

The appellant, after attaining his age, made application to the Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, by petition, to re-hear the cause. And on the 6th of February 1741, the cause standing in the paper, was called on in order to be re-heard; but it then appearing, that the original decree of the 30th of November 1735, and the report of the 15th of November 1736, and the order of the 17th of January 1736, made on hearing the report, were signed and inrolled; his Lordship was pleased to order the petition for re-hearing to be dismissed.

The report of the 4th of November 1741, concerning what was due to Mr. Beckford, was confirmed unless cause, by an order of the 12th of February 1741, and afterwards made absolute, on the 27th of the same month.

From this decree, and the subsequent reports and orders, the present appeal was brought; and for the appellant it was insisted (D. Ryder, J. Browne), that he was neither executor or administrator to his father, and claimed no part of his personal estate, or any part of his real estate, except what was settled upon him by strict settlement, and in which his father had barely an estate for life, that determined on his death; and that therefore the appellant was not bound to perform his father's covenants. And in case the Court should compel him to a specific performance of this agreement out of his own estate, without his consent, he would be in a worse condition, by being an infant at the time of the hearing, than he could have been if of full age, since it cannot be pretended, that the Court could have made such a decree against him had he been of age, without his own express consent to it. That should the appellant be obliged to pay the mortgage money, interest, and costs, which now amounted to £7850 or thereabouts, he could not be repaid any part of it, or any interest for his money, till after the death of the respondent Fleetwood, who, though very old, was healthy, and [307] might live several years: the money advanced by the appellant's father, and now due to his administrator, with interest to this time, amounted to £4850, and if the respondent Fleetwood was now dead, these two sums, with the £5000 which he had a power to charge, making together £17,700, must be raised by sale of part of the estate in question; and supposing the same to be worth £30,000 according to the Master's report, what would remain of the estate, would be worth no more than £12,300, in which, by the settlement, the appellant could have no greater estate than for life, chargeable with £400 a year to the respondent Fleetwood's wife, who was little more than fifty years of age, and very healthy: from all which calculations, it would evidently be of prejudice to the appellant, to carry this agreement into execution; and if the uses of the settlement had been truly represented to the Master, so that it had appeared upon his report, that the appellant was only tenant for life; it was apprehended, the Court would hardly have made such a decree, or declared it to be for the appellant's benefit to perform the agreement.

On the part of the respondent Fleetwood, it was said (T. Clarke, H. Legge), that the agreement made with him by the appellant's father, was, at the time of its being first made, very greatly to the advantage of him and his family, since an estate of the yearly value of £1180 besides fines on the renewal of leases, and worth above £30,000 to be sold, was thereby settled upon the appellant's father and his issue, subject only to an estate for the life of the respondent Fleetwood, who was at that time above sixty years old, and to a jointure of £400 a year which his wife would be entitled to in case she survived him, and only charged with debts to the amount of