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same thing. But if Mrs. Vernon could by any possibility prevail upon an appeal, in setting aside the decree of 1686, the suffering her to appeal in this extraordinary manner, would be putting Carter and the rest of Colonel Vernon's mortgagees, without ever hearing them, in the very situation she represents herself now to be in; though their case is infinitely stronger and much more favourable than hers; their title being under letters patent from the Crown, confirmed by act of parliament and a judicial determination; whereas Mrs. Vernon's was a title, which her testator must be supposed to know to be a defective one at the time he took it; because all she relied upon was the proceedings in the House of Lords in Ireland, without any conveyance even from Mary Vernon, pursuant to the directions of their pretended decree: besides, by Mary Vernon's answer in that House, she disclosed the right of the remainder-man under Colonel Vernon's will, and also of his mortgagees, so that John Vernon must know, that their right could not be barred by a judgment to which they were no parties, and he must likewise know, that the House of Lords had at that time no jurisdiction to pronounce that judgment, it having long before the mortgage been judicially determined by the House of Lords in England, that the House of Lords in Ireland had no such jurisdiction;^[1] and the act of parliament in 1723, did not introduce any new law, but was only declarative of what the law was before. Lastly, that the circumstances of Mrs. Vernon's case were not such as should induce the House to break through all the established rules, and make an ex-[450]-traordinary precedent in her favour; for as she admitted a possession of the mortgaged premises for nineteen years, it was impossible there could be any thing considerable remaining due to her; but for whatever might remain due, she had a right to recover it against the representatives of the mortgagor, and was entitled to receive a satisfaction, if her mortgage was real, out of his personal estate and if she had any remedy against the respondent, or the estate in his possession, she had a bill now depending in Ireland against him, for that purpose, and ready for hearing; when the Court would have regularly under consideration, how far under the circumstances of her case, she was to be barred by the former decree, and when all parties interested would have an opportunity of being heard.

Both these petitions were referred to a Committee of the Lords; who, on the 21st of April 1740, reported, "that they had met upon the matter, and heard one counsel of a side; and upon consideration of the case, their Lordships had not thought proper to report any opinion, but had directed the state of the case to be reported specially to the House." Whereupon it was ordered, that one counsel of a side might be heard at the bar of the House, in relation to this matter, if they thought fit. (Journ. vol. 25. p. 442. 447. 518.)

Accordingly, after hearing counsel for Mrs. Vernon upon the matter of the report, and also counsel for Captain Vernon, who in the course of his pleading waived insisting on the standing order of the House; it was ordered, that the petitioner, Mrs. Vernon, should be at liberty to exhibit an appeal from the said decree, or order of dismission of the Court of Chancery in Ireland, if she thought fit.^[2] (Jour. 25. p. 522.)