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Exchequer; the respondents, who were then in actual contempt of that Court, could not be admitted to complain of a contempt in the appellants, without previously clearing their own. The brief in question did not come into the hands of the appellants, till after the trial was over, consequently the respondents were not prejudiced in their defence, by the appellants Knowledge of their instructions to counsel; or if they could be imagined to have been damnified by this fortuitous knowledge of the appellants, they should have applied, not to the Court of Exchequer, who had nothing to do with the prosecution, but to the Court where the trial was had; or they might have sought their remedy against the appellants by an action at law. That there could not now be any doubt of the injustice of setting up the notes, as the respondents the Conways had never answered the appellant Bateman's bill, exhibited in the Court of Chancery in Ireland, for an injunction to stay all proceedings at law for the recovery of those notes; but having stood out all process of contempt, even to a sequestration, the appellant Bateman had obtained a conditional decree against them, which had since been made absolute, and the notes ordered to be brought into Court and lacerated.—But this decree might be rendered of no effect, if the orders for attaching the appellants should not be reversed; as the respondents might possibly insist not only upon the appellants paying the day-fees for near two years since the orders were made, but also the contents of the notes themselves, before the attachments were taken off, which would tend to the greatest oppression imaginable.

[524] On the other side it was contended (W. Murray, K. Evans), that from the examinations of the appellants, and of Studert and Stoughton, as well as from the nature of the transaction, it plainly appeared, that the brief was taken and detained with an unjust, fraudulent, and wicked intent, in order, by discovering the secrets of the respondents case, and the nature of their defence, to enable the appellants to procure witnesses to contradict it; and as the brief contained matters relative to & cause then depending in the Court of Exchequer, the offence became cognizable there, and was a very high contempt of that Court, and properly punishable by attachment. That though the taking of the brief might subject the offender to an action at law, or even to a criminal prosecution, yet the Court of Exchequer was entitled not only to have its justice and honour satisfied, by a due punishment of the persons guilty of so great a contempt, but had, as all courts of justice have, full power to punish such contempt. And though it might be insisted, that the brief was not in itself evidence against the respondents; yet as a discovery of the secrets and merits of their case might be productive of perjury and subornation of perjury, and thereby a cause of great oppression upon the suitors, as well as an obstruction to the justice of the court wherein the cause was then depending; and as this discovery was obtained in so surreptitious a manner, the offence was highly deserving the censure and punishment of that Court. That as to the order of the 19th of February 1750, not allowing the appellant Bateman to dismiss his bill in the Court of Exchequer, after the application to that Court for an attachment against him, it was insisted, that the said order was just, and agreeable to the daily practice of courts of equity who constantly refuse this liberty, when it is intended for the purposes of oppression, and to elude the justice of the Court, as was plainly the present case.

After hearing counsel on this appeal, it was ordered and adjudged, that the order of the 19th of February 1750, discharging the order made on the 12th of the same month, for dismissing the appellant Bateman's bill in the Court of Exchequer, with costs, should be reversed; and that the orders of the 22d of November 1750, and 23d of May 1751, should be affirmed. (Jour. vol. 28. p. 35.)