Translation:Shulchan Aruch/Yoreh Deah/127

Contains 4 Seif.

Section 1:

If someone tells his friend, "Your wine was used for idolatry," and it is in his possession, he is trustworthy—even if it is no longer in his possession and has already been returned to the owner. If this is the first time he finds it and says, "Your wine was used for idolatry," he is trustworthy, even if the owner denies it. However, if the wine is not in his possession and he did not say this to the owner the first time he saw it, but only later, he is not trustworthy if the owner denies it (while speaking). If he says, "I don’t know," but remains silent, his silence is considered an admission.

Rema: And it is advised that initially, the person should say, “I do not believe you,” and in that case, everyone agrees it is permitted, as the owners are trustworthy regarding their property. And if the owners do not deny him, even if someone else denies him later, it is not effective (Maimonides’ Gloss, Chapter 11). If the owners are present and silent, it is effective. However, if the owners are not present, it works (Long Explanation). There is an opinion that one witness’s denial is insignificant (Rashba, Chapter 175). If the owners say, “I do not believe you,” even though in their hearts they believe him, like two witnesses, we do not need to be strict (Beit Yosef in the name of Mordechai). This is specifically regarding wine used for idolatry, where one does not need to be overly meticulous, but for other prohibitions, it does not work if someone says, “I do not believe you,” if he believes in his heart (Long Explanation, Chapter 13).

This is valid only if he says, “Your wine was used for idolatry in your presence,” or says, “You know that this is common to say.” If he remained silent and later denied it, saying, "The reason I was silent initially was not to admit, but to settle my thoughts and recall if it was true," he is trustworthy.

Rema: If he did not tell the owner the first time they met and later gives an explanation why he did not tell him initially, we must be cautious about his words (Glosses of Mordechai, Chapter "The One Who Says"). Anyone who is trusted for something and witnesses deny him—even though he has a strong argument that he was trusted to prohibit—it does not work if the witnesses deny him, since the denial of witnesses is like an argument in the place of witnesses, and he is not trusted, even for something prohibited. Nevertheless, for him, it is prohibited, as he has made himself a piece of prohibited matter (this is the implication from Beit Yosef in the name of the Rashba’s responsum).

A butcher who made a sign on an animal, as is done for animals with disqualifying signs, and claims that the animal is disqualified, but later says it is permitted, and did not say so initially, only to keep the option to take meat from it—there is an opinion that, since he gives an explanation for his words, he is trustworthy. See above in Section 1 regarding the trustworthiness of one witness in prohibitions.

Two brothers are considered as one witness regarding prohibitions (Rashba, Responsum 175).

All those who are disqualified as witnesses are valid regarding prohibitions unless they are suspected in those matters (R. Nissim).

If one says to two partners, “Your wine was used for idolatry,” and one remains silent while the other denies him, it is prohibited for the silent one, but permitted for the other and for everyone else. (Glosses of Alfasai).

These matters apply when he does it without charge or even for a small fee, where it does not result in losing his payment, such as when he says the wine was used for idolatry by force or for a small wage. But if he was paid a large amount and it results in him losing his entire payment, such as when he says it was used for idolatry through negligence, he is trustworthy, even if the wine is no longer in his possession and he did not say so initially.

Rema: This applies specifically when he says the wine was prohibited in a way that is clear and known to everyone, like negligence mentioned above. However, if he claims it in a way that could be argued as a mistake by the worker (who does not lose his payment), he is not trustworthy, even if it results in the loss based on the law (Rabeinu Yerucham).

One witness is trustworthy for permitting something, but not for making something forbidden.

Rema: However, some say that for matters that require clarification—such as when one says, "Come, I will show you a non-Jew who used your wine for idolatry"—we must be cautious of his words (Beit Yosef in the name of Tosafot).

For everything that is not firmly established as permissible or prohibited, one witness is trusted even to prohibit it (Ashri, Chapter "Damages," and Mordechai, Chapter "The Woman").

For any matter that is established as prohibited, such as untithed produce or a piece of unclean meat, the witness is not trusted to permit it unless he has the means to rectify it (G'Z there).

If there are two pieces here, one prohibited and one permitted, the witness is trustworthy to say, “This is permitted, and this is prohibited” (R. Nissim there). A person is trusted on his own property, even in cases where something is firmly prohibited (there in Ashri).

Refer to earlier Section 119 regarding a person suspected of a matter, and to later Section 185 regarding someone who says, "So-and-so is a scholar and permitted this for me," but the scholar denies it.

Refer to Even HaEzer, Section 152, where we discuss whether the mouth that forbids is the same mouth that permits.

A woman is trusted regarding prohibitions to say she fixed it (R. Nissim, Chapter "The One Who Says," and Rishon Le-Chulin). This applies only to definite prohibitions, such as removing the veins from meat. But in cases of doubt, like if there are impure fish among the pure ones, or prohibitions that have leniencies (there in R. Nissim), a woman is not trusted, as women are inclined to be lenient.

A minor does not have the status of a witness to be trusted regarding prohibitions (Rivash, Responsum 185). However, if the minor is sharp and knowledgeable about the matter, and there are grounds for his words, one should be stringent if he testifies about a prohibition (Rashba, Responsum 24).

If he testifies about a rabbinical prohibition to permit and the prohibition is not firmly established, such as checking for leavened bread before Passover, he is trusted because it was instituted by the rabbis (there in Rivash). But if the prohibition is firmly established, he is not trusted at all.

For things that do not have the status of a strong prohibition, but are merely a suspicion that a non-Jew might have swapped it or touched it, there are those who say we rely on a minor since he has reached the age of understanding about guarding things.